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Abstract 
 
Remembering and imagining are intricately related, particularly in imagining 
the future: episodic future thinking. It is proposed that remembering the recent past 
and imagining the near future take place in what we term the remembering-imagining 
system (RIS). The RIS renders recently formed episodic memories and episodic 
imagined near future events highly accessible. We suggest that this serves the purpose 
of integrating past, current, and future goal-related activities. When the RIS is 
compromised, following brain damage and in psychological illnesses, the future 
cannot be effectively imagined and episodic future thinking may become dominated 
by dysfunctional images of the future. 
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A recent and welcome development in memory research is an emerging interest 
in the future, particularly what has been termed episodic future thinking, or episodic 
simulation i.e. imagining future events (both plausible and implausible). It is clear, 
however, that imagining the future owes much to the ability to remember the past 
(Cole, Morrision, & Conway, 2013; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Merck, Topcu, & 
Hirst, submitted for publication; Schacter & Addis, 2007, 2008; Schacter & Madore, 
submitted for publication; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2002) as does 
generating intentionally false memories (Dudai & Edelson, submitted for publication; 
Justice, Morrison, & Conway, 2013; Stroumsa, submitted for publication). Moreover, 
in terms of understanding the brain basis of remembering and imagining it seems that 
both memories and episodic simulations of the future are mediated in large part by the 
same neural networks. In a recent review of the neuroimaging research, Schacter, 
Chamberlin, Gaesser, and Gerlach (2012, p.250) quoted Bernstein and Loftus (2009), 
who concluded, based on their own review of cognitive and neuroimagining studies of 
true versus false memories, that “it might be virtually impossible to tell reliably if a 
particular memory is true or false without independent corroboration (p.373)”. On the 
basis of this evidence it was suggested (Conway, 2009) that perhaps we should be 
using the term remembering-imagining system (RIS) rather than simply memory 
system. The RIS is considered further below but first I will consider some aspects of 
the future. 
 
The Problem Of the Future 
 
 In classical physics/mechanics a system, a collection of objects e.g. particles, 
fields, waves, etc. is deterministic and reversible (Susskind & Hrabovshy, 2013). This 
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means that given the laws that govern the system and its changes are known, a future 
state can be predicted exactly. Similarly knowing the state of a system at any given 
time means that the state of the system at an earlier or later time can be precisely 
established. Supposing we knew the laws that governed the cognitive, mind/brain, 
system, could we then, for any given individual, predict the exact state of the system 
at a future point? I suggest that we could not, (see Dudai & Edelson, submitted for 
publication, for related arguments). Just as in certain areas of physics, e.g. quantum 
mechanics, it is not possible to precisely predict a future state of a system, so with 
people the future is only probable. However, once a future state has come into being it 
may be possible, to at least some extent, to work back to previous states. Thus, the 
cognitive system may be retrospectively reversible (a point interestingly made by 
Freud, 1920, in the case of psychological states, which given the initial conditions 
cannot be predicted but working back to initial conditions is at least partly possible). 
Nevertheless, retrospectively reversible or not, given that there are an infinite number 
of indeterminate possible futures, this poses a major adaptive problem for goal-driven 
organisms. This is particularly so as the end point of all unrealized goals lies 
somewhere in the future. Indeed, in order to have a goal a future state has to be 
anticipated and often consciously imagined (Cole & Berntsen, 2015). 
 
For many species the future is adapted to possibly by a general preparedness to 
meet environmental contingencies. This is perhaps one of the simplest ways to deal 
with the problem of the future. (Amusingly reflected, perhaps, in the motto of the Boy 
and Girl Scouts, ‘Be prepared!’, Baden-Powell, 1908). No doubt all species have this 
general preparedness, however in our own species more complicated forms of 
cognition have arisen to anticipate possible futures and also, importantly, to constrain 
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what the future can possibly be. Society and culture generally may be one way of 
dealing with a potentially limitless set of futures, and that is because they constrain 
possibilities (Merck, et al., submitted for publication; Wang, submitted for 
publication). Just as memory, especially autobiographical memory constrains the self 
– it limits the universe of possible future selves (Conway, 2005). Thus, memory, 
society, and culture constrain the range of possible futures by providing the context in 
which the future will most probably occur (Welker, submitted for publication). In the 
case of individuals we have argued that there is what we conceive of as an extended 
form of consciousness that consists of memories of the recent past and images and 
expectations of the near future and it is this form of extended consciousness that we 
have termed the remembering-imagining system. 
 
The Remembering-Imagining System (RIS) 
 
We visualize the RIS as a bell curve (of consciousness) moving through time 
with the peak of the curve as ‘now’ or the present moment, cf. Stern (2004). To the 
left of the peak is a declining curve that represents decreasing memory access for the 
recent past as the retention interval increases, and to the right of ‘now’ another 
decreasing curve that represents the specificity of imagined future events, see Figure 
1. The RIS then posits that we have an awareness of the recent past and near future 
that declines into lowered memory accessibility as the retention interval from ‘now’ 
increases. Conversely, future imagined events  - episodic simulations - decrease in 
episodic specificity declining into the schematic/generic/stereotypical, culturally 
specified (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Stroumsa, submitted for publication) future 
memories, as the distance between ‘now’ and the future increases. The boundaries of 
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the RIF are then constantly changing and this is reflected in our constantly changing 
awareness of the near past and the near future. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
To what extent does the idealized representation of the RIS shown in Figure 1 
accurately reflect our memory for the recent past and imaginations of the near future? 
In a recent study we (Loveday & Conway, 2015) had people list all the personal 
events they could remember for each of the past 5 days and all the personal events 
that they the imagined could plausibly occur on each of the next 5 days. The numbers 
of remembered and imagined future events for each are shown in Figure 2. Note that, 
we specifically avoided recall from weekends as we suspected these might feature 
more distinctive events and so somewhat artificially inflate the endpoints of the 5-day 
periods we were sampling. Nonetheless, in pilot work recently conducted we have 
found a similar curve, somewhat more pronounced, for events remembered and 
imagined one month into the past one month into the future. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
It can be seen in Figure 2 that the number of recent memories that can be 
accessed decreases rapidly over the first 3 days but then seems to stabilize and even 
increase slightly at a retention interval of 5 days. Also, interestingly, the number of 
memories recalled on the first day averaged at about 9 memories and varied between 
6 to 12 events over participants but most recalled 7 to 9 events. The specific 
instruction to participants was to ‘recall as many events as you can from yesterday 
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and then from the day before, going back 5 days’. What an ‘event’ was, was left to 
each participant to decide. The events listed typically were of discrete series of 
actions with beginnings and endings marked by changes in actions, locations, and 
goals. For example, “meeting a friend, X, for lunch” and then “attending a lecture on 
Y”, with each event description containing contextual episodic details. The number of 
contextualizing episodic details (essentially who, what, where, and when, plus some 
other more idiosyncratic details) listed for each memory decreased over the 5-day 
retention interval. Thus, the memories not only became fewer they also became less 
specific as the retention interval increased (see too Stroumsa, submitted for 
publication). 
 
For imagined future events the decline was from a mean of 5 events for 
tomorrow to a mean of 4.3 events in 5 days time, a reliable but less steep decline. 
However, the specificity of the imagined future events also decreased as the time 
interval increased. For example, a typical imagined event for tomorrow might be 
“going to the gym at 5 with X & Y tomorrow evening for our zumba class” whereas a 
typical imagined event in 5 days might be more “going to the pub”, “going to the 
cinema”, etc. Thus, the further away in time the imagined events the more typical and 
routine they became with less imagined episodic detail. In other recent research 
(Loveday & Conway, 2015) that collected imagined future events from 1 to 5 and 5 to 
10 years hence, outside the range of the RIS, the imagined events were more typical 
of events from ‘life scripts’ (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004) and were low in episodic 
content. It seems then that the episodic content of imagined future fades into 
culturally determined events, such as getting married, having children, pursuing a 
career, retirement, etc. as episodic future thinking turns into culturally expected future 
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events. We see this phenomenon of fading episodic detail in memories of the past and 
imagining future events more as a bias in the RIS rather than a sort of episodic 
boundary. There are always some events from the past that can be recalled with 
extensive episodic detail and, similarly, some events from the future that can be 
imagined with rich episodic detail. We believe not that not that this cannot be done, 
but rather that it typically is not done.  
 
Another feature of the RIS is that it is present during periods of 
unconsciousness, e.g. during periods of sleep. Indeed it may be during sleep that 
recent and future memories become in some way connected, perhaps by 
integration/consolidation with common and current goals (see Diekelmann & Born, 
2010). In order to explore this we had individuals record their waking thoughts 
immediately upon awakening with the expectations that many of these would be 
about up-coming events and the recent past. Note that recording took place during the 
period of the awakening cortisol response (ACR), when activation rises in the medial 
temporal lobe memory system and, of course, frontal systems that have been to some 
extent dysfacilitated during sleep regain their normal levels of activation. This may 
reflect the RIS coming back on line too. Thoughts were also sampled mid-way 
through the day and again in the evening. Classification of awakening thoughts is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
The two major categories of awakening thoughts are orientation thoughts e.g. 
‘What time is it?’ and thoughts about the ‘close/near’ future, e.g. ‘what am I doing 
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today?’ There were relatively few thoughts about the recent past. These findings 
suggest, perhaps, that the RIS is re-engaging with future episodic imaginings after a 
period of disengagement during sleep. Possibly the ACR in part facilitates a re-
engagement of the medial temporal lobe memory system with executive control 
systems in frontal regions and, thereby, reconnects to representations of the 
immediate future. Thoughts at later points in the day were also goal-oriented but to 
near activities and very recent memories often of task completion, see Figure 3 and 
Loveday and Conway (2015). 
 
There is some evidence then for the idealized bell-shaped curve of the RIS 
shown in Figure 1 and the future component of the RIS seems highly active upon 
awakening. However, although changes in the accessibility of memories of recent past 
events and episodic memories of near future events are reflected in decreasing 
numbers of events recalled with increasing retention interval there are, as noted 
above, other more qualitative changes in the episodicity of what is recalled. Thus, the 
episodicity of both memories of past and future events decreases with increasing 
retention interval (Stroumsa, submitted for publication; Welker, submitted for 
publication). An interesting question that then arises is: What is the range of the RIS? 
Where do its boundaries lie? We suggest that the RIS is part of the goal system, cf. 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) and maintains access to memories of recent events 
that themselves support plausible imaginings of near future events. Raised access to 
recent memories keeps us informed of specific progress with current goals and with 
specific goal-related activities that are up-coming in the near future. The range of 
episodic memories with RIS-raised accessibility may be determined by how the 
content of those memories continues to inform goal activities, perhaps by accurately 
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predicting future events. To take a mundane example, for a student an episodic 
memory of having completed a coursework assignment, say last night, might lead to 
an episodic simulation of handing in the completed course work in the department the 
following day. This simulation when enacted will, in turn, become a recent episodic 
memory that maintains a highly accessible record of achievement of a specific goal 
(embedded in a much more complex goal hierarchy of getting a (good) degree). It is 
important to note that it is not the simulation that becomes a memory but rather its 
enactment that leads to a new episodic memory or set of episodic memories (Conway, 
2009). Thus the episodic simulation through enactment1 has now become a new 
episodic memory that may remain highly accessible in the RIS with accessibility 
gradually decreasing with time, perhaps over only a few days in this example. One 
implication of this view of the RIS is that episodic memory is critically important to 
episodic future thinking, because without it a person could not generate effective 




Related to the notion that recent episodic memories allow the formation of 
(effective or adaptive) episodic simulations (see Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, et al., 
2012 for a detailed review; Schacter & Madore, submitted for publication) we 
recently had the opportunity to study future simulations in a densely amnesic patient 
(Cole, Morrison, Barak, Pauly-Takacs, & Conway, 2015). Patient HCM, a 66 year-old 
highly educated married man with four adult children suffered a series of 
                                                        1 Although beyond the scope of the present work an especially interesting question is how episodic simulations and their later enactments can be distinguished in memory.  
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cardiovascular incidents leading to hospitalization in a rehabilitation centre with 24-
hour care. Although separated from his wife his children visited regularly. Earliest 
evidence of brain damage was a cardiovascular accident in 1998 (at 51 years old). 
This resulted in a left lateralised haemorrhage which required a craniotomy to 
alleviate pressure. He also sustained two traumatic head injuries, one in 2000 (at 53 
years) when he was assaulted with a blow to the head and one in 2002 (at 55) when he 
fell down a staircase. After being hospitalised, he was admitted to a specialist 
neurobehavioural unit for assessment of people with acquired brain injury and aiming 
to remediate ongoing cognitive, behavioural, and physical deficits. In summary the 
conclusion of the assessment was that HCM had multiple diffusely spread infarcts 
indicative of global atrophy extending to both cortical and subcortical regions.  
 
HCM undertook a wide-ranging neuropsychological test battery examining his 
cognitive abilities in a number of domains including executive processing, memory, 
and episodic future thinking. Although HCM was enthusiastic about taking the test 
battery he required 11 testing sessions to complete the tests. This was due to HCM 
repeatedly stopping testing when he became aware of his inability to complete tasks 
to pre-injury levels. This suggests that although he had online awareness of his 
reduced abilities, this did not augment his global self-knowledge of his current 
abilities (see Toglia & Kirk, 2000).  HCM’s language was spared but his working 
memory was impaired. His orientation showed that HCM had difficulty in estimating 
current temporal information and was unable to provide an answer concerning the 
current day, date or month. Also, he was unable to recall when he was admitted to the 
rehabilitation unit. His current year estimate predated the current year by a decade. 
Knowledge of current location was more accurate: HCM accurately described the 
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country, city, and building (‘hospital building’) indicating that he did not have global 
unawareness of his current situation. Finally, he was generally unable to remember 
people he had recently encountered. This anterograde amnesia (AA) was strikingly 
evident in tests of memory: in immediate recall he could recall, to some extent, parts 
of stories and words he had studied, however, following even short delays prior to 
recall he recalled nothing and was at floor on all tests. 
 
HCM’s profile was that of patient with some spared intellectual capacity, 
reasonably good language skills, an impaired working memory, but spared short-term 
memory, and a severely dense AA. He had in effect lost the ability to form new 
episodic memories. Examination of his autobiographical memory found some recall 
of events from early in his life, a few from the period prior to his first stroke, and 
good retention of factual knowledge of his life up to early adulthood. There were, 
however, few specific memories from later life and none at all from the past five 
years. He could not recall the name of a single one of his carers. He had then, in 
addition to his AA a temporally-graded retrograde amnesia (RA). Consequently, 
HCM had a severely damaged RIS and it seemed that his ability for episodic 
simulation of the future may have been compromised. It was decided, therefore, to 
investigate his ability for future episodic simulation. In order to do this we created a 
short and simple Mental Time Travel Questionnaire that required HCM and non-brain 
damaged matched controls to either recall specific autobiographical memories to a 
series of temporal cues e.g. recall an event from last weekend or think of specific 
future events e.g. think of an event that might happen next weekend. Plausibility of 
responses were verified in HCM’s case with one of his sons and for the controls with 




HCM recalled some past events and only a few future events. His future 
episodic simulations were, however, highly implausible. For example, he stated that 
he would invite his family to his apartment for a family gathering. In fact, he owned a 
local apartment but was no longer able to access this due to mobility problems. 
Clinical staff confirmed he had not resided at his apartment since admission and was 
not expected to live there in the future. Nevertheless, HCM voluntarily imagined a 
future scenario involving his apartment. In a similar vein, in 5-10 years he envisioned 
‘passing’ a variety of clinical examinations and moving back into his apartment. Both 
of these events would be unlikely to occur, according to clinicians and his son, 
suggesting that his future thoughts were out-dated and related not to memories of his 
current situation but rather to memories of the conditions that existed in his life before 
his first brain injury years previously. It is important to note that HCM did not 
confabulate those memories he was able to access and it was only in imagining future 
events that his memories became implausible. In general, HCM’s descriptions of his 
personal past and future was marked by a sparcity of episodic information, similar to 
the blankness of the past and future reported by patient KC (Tulving, 1985). We note 
here too the similarity of HCM to those agnosognosic Alzheimer’s patients described 
as having a “petrified self” (Morgrabi, Brown, & Morris, 2009). Plausibility is 
perhaps one of the major differences between images of a future that are effective and 
adaptive in implementing goals and those that are not. Having an intact and 
functioning RIS facilitates the connection of memories of the recent past to episodic 




HCM is a patient not only stranded in the past but also in the future, without a 
record of the recent past he cannot imagine future events that are plausible and linked 
to his current situation – linked to ‘now’ (see Cole, Fotopoulou, Oddy, & Moulin, 
2014, for further discussion of memory plausibility, Stroumsa, submitted for 
publication, for an interesting and related cultural discussion, and Young, submitted 
for publication, for a related discussion of ‘absence’). We have noted previously the 
constraining effect of memories generally on the self, e.g. Conway, (2005), and how 
in some psychological illnesses, in schizophrenic delusions for example, this 
constraining relation appears to break down. This raises the interesting possibility of 
having episodic future simulation that are not adaptive or effective but instead are 
maladaptive and dysfunctional. Consider, for example, a patient with social phobia 
who believed that if she went out of her house she would end up in a supermarket and 
somehow be dragged into one of the large freezers containing bags of frozen 
vegetables and pulled under and ‘drown’ (Day, Holmes, & Hackman, 2004). She had 
a powerful and intrusive episodic future simulation of this happening and this image 
of the future event prevented her from leaving the house. Such images of future 
events are not uncommon in a range of psychological illnesses (Macleaod, submitted 
for publication). For instance suicide attempters often report what Holmes, Crane, 
Fennell, & Williams (2007, Table 2) have termed ‘flash-forwards’ (see too Crane, 
Shah, Barnhofer, & Holmes, 2012, also Table 2). The flash-forwards in these patients 
are to episodic simulations of their own deaths in which they ‘see’ their dead body, 
e.g. at the foot of the cliff, under the wheels of a train, etc. Such intrusive future 
episodic images may be associated with further attempts at suicide. Episodic 
simulations of the future in psychological illnesses may support and even motivate 






The RIS is a hypothesis about the raised accessibility and increased specificity 
of episodic simulations of the recent past and near future. Importantly, the RIS only 
exists now, cf. Stern, 2004, for an exegesis of the concept ‘now’. It is an expansion of 
‘now’ to encompass records of recent and associated upcoming goal-related activities 
(see Johnson & Sherman, 1990, for a particularly interesting discussion of the 
integration of past, present, and future). Its boundaries are constantly changing as 
goals are completed, abandoned, and/or replaced over time. If the ability to form 
episodic memories is lost, as in AA, then the RIS breaks down and effective future 
simulations are no longer possible. It is notable too, that when this occurs the ability 
to operate adaptively and effectively in one’s life is also severely compromised. HCM 
for instance, and as is the case with many AA patients, required 24-hour care.  
 
The idea that episodic future simulations should be effective and adaptive is 
important. After all, any future could be imagined but only a limited number are 
plausible and probable. We suggest that the degree to which future episodic 
simulations are adaptive/effective is determined by the strength of their association to 
specific episodic memories of the recent past (Merck, et al., submitted for publication; 
Schacter & Medore, submitted for publication). The degree to which they are not 
associated with recent episodic memories reflects a malfunctioning RIS, possibly due 
to brain damage or to the effects of a psychological illness. Nevertheless, for many 
individuals there may be some highly specific future episodic simulations that are 
implausible because they have a low probability of occurrence e.g. winning the 
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lottery, etc, and these may be linked to recent episodic memories, e.g. buying a ticket, 
indicating normally functioning RIS. Possibly, the number of plausible to implausible 
episodic simulations held by an individual is some sort of index of mental health or 
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Figure Legends  




Figure 2. Recalled recent and imagined near future events. 
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